Content and Meaning Constitutive Inferences by García-Arnaldos, Mª Dolores
 STUDIA SEMIOTYCZNE, t. XXXIII, nr 1 (2019), s. 29–47 
ISSN 0137-6608, e-ISSN 2544-073X 
DOI: 10.26333/sts.xxxiii1.03 





MARIA DOLORES GARCIA-ARNALDOS * 
 




S U M M A R Y : A priori theories of justification of logic based on meaning often lead to 
trouble, in particular to issues concerning circularity. First, I present Boghossian’s a priori 
view. Boghossian maintains the rule-circular justifications from a conceptual role seman-
tics. However, rule-circular justifications are problematic. Recently, Boghossian 
(Boghossian, 2015) has claimed that rules should be thought of as contents and contents 
as abstract objects. In this paper, I discuss Boghossian’s view. My argumentation consists 
of three main parts. First, I analyse several arguments to show that in fact, Boghossian’s 
inferentialist solution is not fully satisfying. Second, I discuss the matter further, if one 
accepts that basic logical rules are constitutive of meaning, that is, they constitute the 
logical concepts and the content of a rule is an abstract object, then abstract objects—like, 
for example, rules—could be constitutive of meaning. The question is whether conceptual 
priority is in the judgment or in the object and what theory of content is pursued. Grasping 
content as a matter of knowing how a word or concept behaves in inferences is not com-
pletely explicative. Finally, I contend that rules come to exist as a result of certain kinds of 
mental action. These actions function as constitutive norms. Logical rules are not abstract 
objects but ideal. What one construes as norms or rules of content may involve idealiza-
tion, but this is because we share a language. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The main goal of this study is concerned with the meaning and the content of 
the basic logical rules. In particular, this work investigates—in the overall view 
of the contemporary theories in philosophy of logic—the idea of the normative 
content of a rule. 
In recent years, philosophical reflection about the justification of logic has 
been dominated by the enduring problem of circularity and the infinite regress 
puzzle. A priori theories of justification of logic, based on meaning, are standard-
ly recognized to be akin to the conceptual role semantic theories that often lead 
to similar problems; in particular, to issues concerning a vicious circle. In general, 
to justify the logical rules i n f e r e n t i a l l y  involves using logical principles, 
which generates circularity. How can we justify logical laws in a way that 
doesn’t rely on those laws?  
In his defence of an inferential justification, Paul Boghossian (Boghossian, 
2000; 2001; 2003a; 2003b)2 has argued that the only way to justify the basic 
logical principles is to claim a rule-circular justification, according to which, 
knowledge of the validity of the basic rules of inference is the result or product 
of inferences. Boghossian considers the apriority of logical propositions from  
a meaning-based approach, that is, from theories that defend the claim that the 
understanding of the meaning contributes to the explanation of the justification 
of beliefs or the transition between beliefs of a person. In this sense, he assumes 
that the principles of logic, as theoretical principles, are part of the meaning of 
language expressions. Logical constants3 are implicitly4 (tacitly) defined, taking 
logical basic rules into account, which allow their introduction and/or elimina-
tion. According to his proposal, some patterns of basic inference are constitutive 
of meaning, they constitute the concepts. Some theories of a priori justification 
based on meaning, unlike theories, for example, such as that of Carnap (Carnap, 
1937; 1947), among others, are developed from some kind of Conceptual Role 
Semantics5 (hereafter CRS) and emerge as alternative responses to the problems 
that are presented to theories based on intuition (Dogramaci, 2012). CRS theories 
are presented in a variety of ways, just as there are different theories of meaning. 
 
2 I will focus on this article in these Boghossian papers. His position has changed over 
recent years. 
3 The problem of the meaning of logical constants is closely related to that of the justi-
fication of basic logical knowledge (Gómez Torrente, 2007; MacFarlane, 2015). 
4 “In considering implicit definitions, we must bear in mind that they come in two va-
rieties: explicit and implicit. An explicit implicit definition involves an explicit stipulation 
by a thinker that a given sentence S(f) is to be true if its ingredient term f is to mean what 
it does. In the implicit variety, it is somehow tacit in that person’s behavior with the term  
f that S(f) is to be true if f is to mean what it does” (Boghossian, 2008b, chap. 10, p. 218). 
5 While conceptual role semantics (CRS) in the philosophy of language is a theory of 
linguistic meaning, in the philosophy of mind, it is a theory of the mental content of atti-
tudes such as beliefs or desires (Whiting, 2009). 
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In their diversity, what they have in common is that they are theories of meaning-
as-use whose main precursor is Wittgenstein.6 In such theories, the meaning of 
an expression (or the propositional content of an attitude) is determined by the 
role it plays in the subject’s language (or knowledge; Whiting, 2009). 
One of the ways of considering CRS is the so-called i n f e r e n t i a l i s t  con-
ception (Brandom, 2000), according to which, apprehending the concept or un-
derstanding a word is determined by the disposition to infer according to the 
schema or pattern of inference of the concept. Thus, it can be stipulated, for 
example, that I is the concept, “I” is the term and P the schema of inference of 
which I is a constituent part. That is, for each concept there is, according to 
Brandom, a scheme of inference that is constitutive of that concept; so that, he or 
she who has the concept of square, must be able to infer correctly: if x is square, 
then x is not round, where x is an object visible to the subject in question. Being 
willing to infer properly following the right pattern, requires satisfying the pos-
session of concept I or term “I”. On the contrary, if someone is not disposed to 
infer following the correct scheme, he or she does not understand the term or 
does not understand the concept. In some way, this approach comes to the fore in 
his endeavour to spell out what is involved in our command of concepts in terms 
of inferential abilities and our disposition to infer according to the logical rules. 
These aspects point to the core of the dispute between inferentialist and represen-
tationalist conceptions of language. While for inferentialists, judging has the 
conceptual priority since asseverative contents are the smallest units that can 
register in inferences, for representationalists, thinking about F (if-then proposi-
tions, for example), is basic to their theory (Fodor & Lepore, 2002). So, accord-
ing to representationalists, an abstract object like a proposition has primacy over 
propositional thought. Inferentialist conceptions—including Boghossian’s pro-
posal, and the conceptual role semantics (CRS) under any of its forms—have 
received extensive criticism from Williamson (2007) and, among others, also 
from Fodor (one of the advocates of representationalism) and Lepore (1993). 
In this article, I will first analyse Boghossian’s theory of justification based 
on meaning. Boghossian maintains the rule-circular justifications from the con-
ceptual role semantics position, i.e. that principles of logic, as theoretical princi-
ples, are part of the meaning of language expressions. Secondly, I will present 
how the justification of deductive p r a c t i c e  can be connected with the inferen-
tialist conception of the meaning of logical constants. Considering that 
Boghossian explains this concept based on the notion of b l i n d  r e a s o n i n g —
that is, the basic inferential c o m p e t e n c e  that is held prior to any explicit be-
lief about logical validity or the conceptual resources necessary to articulate 
them—we are able to engage in blind reasoning: a capability to use rules without 
knowing those rules. Some of these rules can establish a kind of warrant. 
 
6 Several philosophers uphold one or another version of this approach; some among 
many others are: Strawson, Sellars, Field, Harman, Block, C. McGinn, Peacocke, Bran-
dom. 
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Boghossian (Boghossian, 2003b) emphasizes the distinction between inferential 
and constitutive construals of the relation between meaning and entitlement. 
Recently, Boghossian (Boghossian, 2015) stated that “rules themselves should be 
thought of as contents” and “contents are best thought of as abstract objects […] 
as numbers, properties and propositions, rather than concreta like tables or (to-
ken) books” (Boghossian, 2015, p. 4). 
On the other hand, Williamson (2011) rejects this inferentialist explanation 
and offers, instead, a causal explanation. From Williamson’s point of view, com-
petence regarding public language depends on participation in linguistic practice: 
causal interrelations of speakers unify (in part) a conceptual or linguistic practice 
(Williamson, 2011, p. 504).  
Second, I argue that, if basic inferences or logical rules are constitutive of 
meaning—that is, they constitute the logical concepts and the content of a rule is 
an abstract object (Boghossian, 2015)—then abstract objects—like, for example, 
rules—are constitutive of meaning. From this approach, some philosophers con-
sider that these logical concepts are abstract objects and that these concepts 
“must have been brought into being by the creative activity of human beings” 
(Boghossian, 2015, p. 4). Boghossian believes that the role of conceptual creativ-
ity is understood better “within a framework in which we talk not about creating 
abstracta, but about selecting them, or discovering them” (Boghossian, 2015,  
p. 11).  
Finally, I expound the idea that rules, conversely to Boghossian’s approach, 
come to exist as a result of certain kinds of mental action. Such a possibility 
occurs when something that we call “mental action” is carried out. The role of 
these actions is, roughly speaking, to function as constitutive norms, in this sense, 
logic is constitutive of thinking; thinking, as second nature (McDowell, 1994), 
takes place as part of human enrichment. 
1. BOGHOSSIAN’S INFERENTIALIST PROPOSAL 
1.1. Basic Inference as Constitutive of Meaning of the Logical Concepts 
In this section, I am going to analyse Boghossian’s meaning-based theory of 
justification and the question of how to connect the justification of deductive 
practice with the inferentialist conception of the meaning of logical constants. 
Boghossian explains this theory based on the notion of b l i n d  r e a s o n i n g ; 
blind reasoning is the basic inferential competence that is held before any explic-
it beliefs about logical validity or the conceptual resources necessary to articulate 
them. 
Boghossian’s thesis maintains that one can justify the belief that a rule is cor-
rect from the knowledge of the meaning of the expression, that is, knowledge of 
the meaning of the conditional, for example, is sufficient to know that Modus 
Ponendo Ponens (MPP) is a valid inference rule. Moreover, according to inferen-
tialism, the meaning of the expression is constituted by the rules of inference. It 
is said of these rules that they cannot be justified in terms of any other because 
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they are constitutive of the meaning of the logical constant in question; in this 
case, the MPP is a constitutive rule of the meaning of the conditional. Logical 
principles admit, then, a kind of justification that is a priori and is r u l e -
c i r c u l a r . The basic rules of inference are justified by inferences among which 
are those same basic rules that they are intended to justify. The problem for rule-
circular justifications and inferential justification in general, in the case of logical 
knowledge, is that both are rejected because of their circularity.7 For example, 
we consider that MPP is the only non-derivative inference rule, if we want to 
justify a priori the MPP from the knowledge of the meaning of the logical con-
stant “if, then”, in this justification the MPP is assumed in at least a step, without 
previously being justified (Boghossian, 2001, p. 10). That is, we acquire 
knowledge of the MPP using only the logical rules and no non-inferential 
knowledge (Wright, 2001, p. 68). In short, the problem is that in the deduction of 
the validity of the MPP, we use the MPP, which generates a vicious circle. Spe-
cifically, in ordinary circular justifications, one observes two mistakes; first, 
b e g g i n g  t h e  q u e s t i o n: it assumes what it is trying to prove. The conclusion 
explicitly asserts the presupposed premises stated at the beginning, which goes 
against the idea of what it means to prove something or argue it.  
Second, b a d  c o m p a n y: if we accept the rule-circular justifications, we 
will be able to demonstrate the correctness of rules that are not correct. The rule-
circularity allows you to prove anything, even if it is unjustifiable (Boghossian, 
2001, p. 11). Since an argument justifies an assertion only if it comes from prem-
ises that are justified, a related question is whether the knowledge of the premis-
es depends on prior knowledge of the conclusion. This kind of circularity is 
usually called e p i s t e m i c  c i r c u l a r i t y . However, Boghossian considers that 
the MPP can be justified inferentially by rule-circular justification, which re-
quires explaining that not every rule-circular justification falls into these two 
errors.  
Although circular argumentation is not inherently fallacious, it can be if the 
argumentation is used to conceal, in a certain way, that one fails to prove some-
thing completely. Firstly, b e g g i n g  t h e  q u e s t i o n  (Hansen, 2015) is defined 
as an argument in which what one wants to demonstrate is presupposed. Suppose 
that someone is asked to prove that this book (whose authorship is the subject 
being discussed) was written by Gala, to which that person responds by saying: 
“All the books here were written by Gala”. Without independent evidence, the 
premise that “all the books were written by Gala” considers warranted the claim 
that “this book was written by Gala”, instead of demonstrating this by satisfying 
the requirements of proof. In this case, the question is whether an argument in 
which the MPP rule is used justifies the validity of that rule since we are using 
the same rule whose validity we try to prove (Boghossian, 2000, p. 248). 
 
7 Along with Devitt (2005), which is based on Braithwaite, Dummett does not see any 
problem here. This is what he calls a “pragmatic circularity” (Boghossian, 2008b, p. 199). 
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Boghossian argues that the argument in which the MPP rule is used to justify 
such a rule (and so, the conclusion is already presupposed before having proven 
it), would not amount to begging the question if the knowledge of the premises is 
obtained properly regardless of the conclusion. To solve the problem of begging 
the question, then, we must resolve the question of whether the justified rule-
circular belief that a rule, such as MPP, preserves the truth enables us to use that 
rule of inference, and how a circular-rule argument can warrant its conclusion 
(Boghossian, 2001, p. 12).  
On the other hand, we have the bad company problem. Boghossian points out 
that there is a big difference between an ordinary (or grossly) circular argument, 
where the conclusion is one of the premises, and a rule-circular argument, in 
which the rules whose validity is to be demonstrated are used during the proof 
(Boghossian, 2000, p. 245). In any case, the problematic situation that arises is 
that a rule-circular justification seems to be available for any rule (Wright, 2001, 
p. 49), that is the objection of bad company, as the connective (“tonk”) of the 
example of Prior (1960).  
In his brief article The Runabout Inference Ticket, Prior criticizes a certain 
idea of the definition of the logical constants. Prior takes the case of the conjunc-
tion to present the theory of meaning that he intended to discuss. According to 
that theory, the rules of introduction and elimination of the conjunction establish 
the meaning, and because someone knows the meaning of that constant, he or 
she knows how to infer using the conjunction. Similarly, the connective “tonk” 
could be established:  
Its meaning is completely given by the rules that (i) from any statement P we can 
infer any statement formed by joining P to any statement Q by “tonk” (which 
compound statement we hereafter describe as “the statement P-tonk-Q”), and that 
(ii) from any “contonk-tive” statement P-tonk-Q we can infer the contained state-
ment Q. (Prior, 1960, p. 39) 
Prior argues that the definition of logical constants is not clearly determined 
and that any statement can be inferred from another in an a n a l y t i c a l l y  v a l -
i d  way; for example, using the new constant “tonk” we can infer in two steps  
“2 plus 2 equals 5” from “2 plus 2 equals 4” (Prior, 1960, pp. 38–39). This ap-
proach of analytical validity creates a plethora of other possibilities for other 
rules with connectives such as “tonk”, that is, it allows one to produce rules of 
inference arbitrarily. This is one of the objections that any inferentialist theory 
must solve. 
Boghossian (Boghossian, 2000, p. 251, note 19), following Dummett (Dum-
mett, 1991, p. 202), considers that not all rule-circular arguments involve the two 
errors indicated. He proposes a theory based on the conceptual role to deal with 
the problems that circularity presents. According to this theory, a genuine defini-
tion of the logical constant in question is required in such a way that the argu-
ments based on the basic inference rules linked to that constant are valid. This 
definition will prevent a rule-circular justification from being available for any 
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rule. Defended in this way, the rule-circular arguments avoid the charge of bad 
company. According to Boghossian (Boghossian, 2001, p. 28), the dilemma is to 
explain how a person can reason in a certain way, without that person’s knowing 
(knowing the validity of) the rule contained in his or her reasoning. Boghossian 
illustrates what our constants mean based on their conceptual role: 
(…) that our logical words (in the language of thought) mean what they do by vir-
tue of their inferential role, that “if, then”, for example (or more precisely, its 
mentalese equivalent) means what it does by virtue of participating in some infer-
ences and not in others. If this is correct, and if, as is overwhelmingly plausible, it 
is by virtue of its role in fundamental (i.e., underived) inference that the condi-
tional means what it does, then we have an immediately compelling answer to the 
question: how could someone be entitled to reason according to MPP without hav-
ing a positive belief that entitles him to it. If fundamental inferential dispositions 
fix what we mean by our words, then, as I shall now try to show, we are entitled to 
act on those dispositions prior to and independently of having supplied an explicit 
justification for them. (Boghossian, 2001, pp. 28–29, italics mine). 
Then, Boghossian proposes that for the case of basic inferences, the rule in-
volved must be m e a n i n g - c o n s t i t u t i n g ; this would explain why the person 
is entitled to use the rule without a demand that he or she knows that the rule 
preserves the truth (Boghossian, 2001, p. 29). So, he formulates the following 
principle: 
(L) If M is a genuinely meaning‐constituting rule for S, then S is entitled to infer 
according to M, independently of having supplied an explicit justification for M. 
Notice that (L) does not require that S know that M is meaning‐constituting for S 
if S to be entitled to infer according to M but only that M be meaning‐constituting 
for S. (Boghossian, 2000, p. 250) 
Boghossian must argue that rule-circular justifications are genuine justifica-
tions as long as we distinguish between a rule-circular and an ordinarily (grossly) 
circular argument, since the latter does not guarantee trivial success. If you rely 
on a small number of uses of a particular rule, an adequate rule-circular argument 
allows you to support that rule preserving the truth in any possible use necessari-
ly only in the instance that the rule in question is constitutive of the meaning 
(Boghossian, 2000, p. 254). For this, it must be established that the meaning of 
logical constants is determined by their conceptual role. If an inferential disposi-
tion constitutes the meaning, then it is a fortiori reasonable, so it can be used 
justifiably without a supporting argument (Boghossian, 2000, p. 250). 
On the other hand, one of the problems of the CRS is that it is based on a ho-
listic approach to meaning (or content) (Whiting, 2009), this implies that an 
expression cannot have meaning by itself, since, as we have indicated above, an 
expression is significant by virtue of its inferential relations. This represents  
a difficulty from the point of view of communication since, according to this 
semantic approach, the inferential meaning of an expression will depend on the 
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beliefs that a subject has. If two subjects have different beliefs about an expres-
sion, each one will be willing to infer according to inferential transitions that 
understand that expression, and if the beliefs of the subject change, the inferen-
tial transitions, therefore, will be diverse. As Martínez-Vidal states: 
(…) intuitionists and classical logicians have tried to solve the dispute putting 
forward the import that maintaining one position or the other has for mathematical 
practice. But of course, determining whether a given mathematical practice is 
right depends, to a certain extent, on the philosophical thesis we assume. This is 
so because our intuitions or judgements about the correctness of a given argument 
will differ depending on (…) our philosophical views. (Martínez-Vidal, 2004,  
p. 204) 
Hence, if we consider that the same word, according to the CRS, has different 
meanings and is to be understood in different ways, it will be practically impos-
sible that the meaning remains constant (Whiting, 2009). To avoid these prob-
lems, several authors, including Boghossian, argue that analytical/synthetic dis-
tinction is needed to differentiate the inferential transitions that determine the 
meaning (or the content) and those that do not: 
This would provide something constant—an invariant significance—that 
could be grasped despite differences in belief. And, moreover, it respects 
compositionality, since the meaning of a complex expression is fixed only 
by its role in analytic inferences, and that is determined by the meaning of 
its parts. (Whiting, 2009) 
In Epistemic Analyticity: A Defense (2003b), Boghossian presents his defence 
of epistemic analyticity to explain our knowledge of the validity of basic princi-
ples of inference. Boghossian takes the notion of analyticity as a property of 
linguistic items from which grasping the meaning of a sentence is enough to 
justify belief in the proposition it expresses. Or similarly, grasping a proposition 
p is sufficient to justify his belief in p: 
I will talk of grasp of the meaning of a sentence as sufficing for justified belief in 
the proposition it expresses; but I could equally well have talked simply about 
grasp of a proposition p as sufficing for justified belief in p. Thus, too, I will talk 
about words being synonymous with each other; but I could equally well have 
talked about concepts being identical to one another. Finally, I will talk of holding 
some sentences true, as a condition of meaning some specific proposition by them; 
but I could equally well have talked of believing some propositions as a condition 
of having some of their ingredient concepts. (Boghossian, 2008b, p. 212) 
Epistemic analyticity is a way of explaining how factual propositions can be 
known a priori. The models for the construction of the epistemic analyticity that 
Boghossian presents are three: the Frege-analyticity, the Carnap-analyticity and 
the constitutive model (Boghossian, 2008b). According to the constitutive model, 
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the semantic facts themselves provide the necessary justification, as opposed to 
the knowledge that a subject can have of them (Boghossian, 2008b, pp. 4–5). 
Boghossian states that, by the mere fact that the subject grasps the meaning of 
the rule of inference from R, it implies that this subject is enabled to infer ac-
cording to R. Thus, any inferential transition from the conditions of possession of 
a concept is by itself, prima facie, entitling, that is, it gives a warrant. 
The problem is how to avoid the charge of bad company faced by this model 
that seems to have counterexamples of the type of “tonk”, which we have already 
presented; that is, the rules for “tonk” are not correct, they allow one to move 
from true premises to any conclusion, including false conclusions (Boghossian, 
2001, p. 13); but what is wrong in a rule-circular justification of one of the “tonk” 
rules is not circularity (Boghossian, 2001, pp. 33–34), but the fact that practice 
according to that rule fails to constitute any meaning: 
(…) a practice which allowed that “A tonk B” may be inferred from either A or B 
individually, and that both A and B individually may be inferred from it, would es-
tablish no meaning for “tonk”. By contrast, the practice of inference in accordance 
with modus ponens is part of a meaning constituting practice: a practice which 
constitutes the meaning of “if…, then…” And that, ultimately, is why we may in 
principle justify the belief that modus ponens is sound by a derivation which uses 
modus ponens in its course. (Wright, 2001, p. 52) 
To safeguard this model, Boghossian suggests the following: restrict the 
model to certain concepts in which an entitlement is given or restrict what we are 
going to consider as a genuine concept. This is the correct way to understand the 
conceptual semantic role (Boghossian, 2001) and avoid the problem of bad com-
pany. 
A conceptual role semantics, by virtue of its ties to the notion of justification, 
transforms this constraint on meaning into a constraint on justification that simul-
taneously vindicates the possibility of rule-circular justifications while staving off 
the threat of an unpalatable relativism. (Boghossian, 2001, pp. 33–34) 
Thus, Boghossian proposes an improved version of the constitutive model: 
any rules written into the possession conditions for a non-defective concept are  
a fortiori entitling. So, how could a thinker be entitled to reason according to 
MPP just by virtue of grasping the meaning of that rule? The answer is that he or 
she can be so entitled because MPP is a possession condition for the conditional, 
and the conditional is a non-defective concept. 
2. CONCEPTUAL ROLE DETERMINES A MEANING? 
According to Boghossian, following certain rules of inference is constitutive 
of our understanding of primitive logical constants. Secondly, if certain rules of 
inference are constitutive of our understanding of certain concepts, then we are 
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entitled to them, even in the absence of any reflexively appreciable support. To 
deal with the problem of bad company, Boghossian presents a solution based on 
the CRS approach; but, from a purely theoretical foundation of meaning, to say 
that any possible conceptual role determines one meaning or another, as was 
mentioned, is not enough. 
We should insist that a conceptual role determines a meaning for an expression 
only if it manages to contribute in some determinate way to determining how the 
world would have to be if sentences involving the expression are to be true. 
(Boghossian, 2001, p. 33) 
To conclude, the arguments Boghossian has offered demonstrate that the rule-
circular argument for MPP allows the use of MPP (use to which we are enabled 
if the MPP is a rule that constitutes the meaning) to be able to determine that 
MPP necessarily preserves the truth in any possible use (Boghossian, 2000,  
p. 252). If the rules involved in the rule-circular justification are rules constitu-
tive of meaning, we are entitled to use those rules of inference, independently of 
whether we are justified in believing that any such rule is valid. In this way, 
Boghossian argues that basic logical knowledge is justified inferentially and that 
circular-rule justifications are genuine justifications. To explain how a person is 
enabled to infer, without implying that the person knows something about the 
rule used in his inference, he responds that this entitlement naturally flows from 
considering the rules as meaning-constituting (Boghossian, 2000, p. 249), and 
proposes his approach concerning warrant transfer (Boghossian, 2001, p. 29). 
On the other hand, Williamson (2007) argues that all knowledge is proposi-
tional. Thus, while Boghossian starts from the fact that linguistic or conceptual 
practice is a precondition for understanding certain links, such as understanding-
assent, Williamson objects to Boghossian that no justification or knowledge can 
be derived from linguistic or conceptual competence. Among other reasons, 
while knowing implies assenting or accepting, from the assertion or acceptance 
knowledge does not necessarily follow (Williamson, 2007, p. 76). 
Williamson, in addition, underlines an aspect that is important. For 
Boghossian, logical-term competence involves assenting to the kind of under-
standing-assent link required (Williamson, 2011, p. 503). Williamson argues that 
such links are not necessary. When a word or term belongs to a public language, 
being competent about that term involves causal relationships with other speak-
ers, other subjects. The question is what explanation of the linguistic competence 
is pursued.  
According to Boghossian conceptual practice is a precondition for under-
standing links such as understanding-assent, but for Williamson (2007), the idea 
that understanding-assent links are the case belongs to an inaccurate theory of 
meaning, according to which, if these links do not occur, the distinction between 
understanding and not understanding is dissolved. Speakers who understand the 
same term may have nothing in common that constitutes a shared meaning.  
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On the other hand, Williamson offers an alternative theory of meaning ac-
cording to which such links do not exist and there is a shared language. He re-
jects the thesis that the shared understanding of a word requires a stock of shared 
obviousness. This is because to defend this presupposes acceptance that the uses 
by different agents can be united to form a common practice of using that word 
with a given meaning only due to an invariant core of beliefs. Therefore, accord-
ing to Williamson, the idea that understanding is epistemologically sufficient to 
assent is based on a false conception of what it is to understand. The social de-
termination of meaning is not based on the idea that meaning cannot be deter-
mined individually; but, when an individual uses a shared language as such, the 
individual meaning is parasitic on social meaning. Much of the practical value of 
language is its ability to facilitate communication between agents in asymmetric 
epistemic positions when the speaker knows something that the listener does not 
know. The practical constraint for communication is that there must be a back-
ground of broad agreement in the use of the terms. This practical constraint is 
holistic (the agreement at a certain point can be exchanged by agreement with 
others). However, the existence of a broad agreement is not a necessary condi-
tion. For example, being competent in the use of English does not require the 
acceptance of the principle of non-contradiction. 
In this way, Williamson rejects the inferentialist explanation and offers, in-
stead, an approach based on the causal interrelations between speakers; it is these 
relationships that constitute the competence and we agree with this explanation: 
the competence regarding public language depends on participation in linguistic 
practice. Causal interrelations of speakers unify (in part) a conceptual or linguis-
tic practice (Williamson, 2011, p. 504). From my point of view, and as McDow-
ell (1994) pointed out, a shared language is a primary medium in which under-
standing is generated. 
On the other hand, Wright (2004a) argues that being constitutive of meaning 
based on b l i n d  r e a s o n i n g  is not sufficiently explanatory since it does not 
clarify how “blind” inferences confer knowledge. Thus, the problem of 
Boghossian’s approach is not with respect to the acquisition of knowledge, as 
Wright contends, but with respect to the justification for it. Blind reasoning as an 
explanation of the second is not enough.  
According to Wright, we can consider a kind of justification in a non-
inferential weak sense, a rational warrant that does not require evidence of truth 
and can avoid both circularity and the infinite regress of justifications. This war-
rant consists of a mode of acceptance of a proposition and may be rational but 
not equivalent to belief (in the primary meaning of belief). It is the entitlement to 
assume the initial presuppositions, as long as there is no evidence against them, 
even if there is no evidence in their favour (Wright, 2004a, p. 161). This rational 
warrant is also a viable solution for the particular case of logic. Wright argues 
that basic rules of inference such as the MP are one of the types of initial presup-
positions. We can trust in the validity of basic inferences, and this, in the end, 
enables us to state knowledge of the reasoning products obtained through the 
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application of that basic logic (Wright, 2004b, p. 208). In the case of logical 
knowledge, a logical proposition is presented with a statement as following nec-
essarily from the premises within a given logical system.  
If, in addition, one considers that basic inferences are basic mental actions 
that function as constitutive norms (Wright, 2014), then one accepts that the 
meaning of logical expressions is given by the basic rules. For Wright, justifica-
tion does not derive from conceptual understanding but rather, the rules should 
be assumed as a starting point.  
However, this approach presents several problems (Garcia-Arnaldos, 2017). 
On the one hand, it is not clear how to explain the status of the fundamental rules 
of inferences. On the other, basic inferences can assume patterns that are not very 
solid, sometimes we make mistakes, for example, confusing the directionality of 
if-then propositions (fallacious modus ponens). To solve these problems, we 
must first answer the question, what is a rule? 
3. ABSTRACT OBJECT AS CONTENT FOR A RULE 
Regarding how can we define a rule, Boghossian claims that “rules them-
selves should be thought of as contents” and “contents are best thought of as 
abstract objects (…) as numbers, properties and propositions, rather than with 
concreta like tables or (token) books” (2015, p. 4).  
The question whether there are abstract objects such as numbers, universals, 
and propositions, is analysed in many contemporary philosophical debates. Sev-
eral philosophers argue that abstract objects exist, but they are conceived as 
mind-independent objects (without causal contact). Some philosophers consider 
that logical concepts are abstract objects and that these concepts “must have been 
brought into being by the creative activity of human beings” (Boghossian, 2015, 
p. 4); for instance, Thomasson’s conception of some abstract objects as artifacts 
(Thomasson, 2014), i.e. tools designed to improve our ability to represent reality. 
Others are not willing to accept abstract objects in their ontology. 
Boghossian believes that the role of conceptual creativity is understood better 
“within a framework in which we talk not about creating abstracta, but about 
selecting them, or discovering them” (2015, p. 11):  
When one is born into a society that has accepted certain norms and lives by them, 
and if one continues to live with and benefit from that society, then, other things 
being equal, one is obligated to live by the norms that are accepted in that society 
(…). 
The main point right now is that it would be a mistake to look for a source of 
normativity either in the rule itself or in the mere fact that a rule has been accepted. 
If there is an obligation to obey a rule it cannot come from any source other than 
from the requirements of morality, which, as I previously emphasized, provide  
a norm on behaviour independently of whether they have been accepted. 
(Boghossian 2015, p. 11) 
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In my belief, rules come to exist as a result of certain kinds of mental action, 
when a certain mental action is carried out. The role of these actions is, roughly 
speaking, to function as constitutive norms, as Wright pointed out. The word 
“norm” or “normative” is usually defined as involving a rule or correctness. 
Normative inferentialism maintains that the meaning of a word is constituted by 
rules or norms governing inferences, so the meaning of expressions is constituted 
by the rules of inference. For Broome (2013; 2014b), it means involving a reason 
or ought.  
My premise is that logical rules are not abstract objects, but ideal, similar to 
what Wittgenstein (1953, §38) called “ideal”.8 What we construe as norms or 
rules of content, inferential rules such as MPP, may involve idealization, but this 
is because we already share a language within a given culture. According to 
Railton: 
Logic does involve idealization, the creation of “crystalline” models. But the func-
tion of these models is not to give us an ideal for all thought and language, an im-
age of how the content of our thinking would be structured if all were right with 
us (…).  
The norma and regula were said to function regulatively for us as builders  
a priori—standards we require our cuts to meet, and correct them to fit (…). Witt-
genstein says of logic: “the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result 
of investigation: it was a requirement” (PI 46). But what sort of requirement? One 
sense might be a logico‐metaphysical requirement. (Railton 2000a, p. 189) 
Boghossian assumes the source of normativity as requirements of morality 
(in a society). The source is not in the rule itself and it is not in the mere fact that 
a rule has been accepted. The question is whether—in the requirements of moral-
ity—the conceptual priority is in the judgment or in the object. Boghossian 
doesn’t clarify this issue. I believe that the conceptual priority is in both, in the 
judgment and the object (in this case, the logical rules) and the requirements are 
logico‐metaphysical ones. That is, logical rules are neither prescriptions of think-
ing nor psychological laws. “Their ‘validity’ or necessity is sui generis; if any-
thing, it is what we might today call metaphysical” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2018). 
These points are to be stressed; as Wright (2014) argues, one is able to ration-
ally rely on the validity of basic inferences because they are basic mental actions 
that function as constitutive norms, (in the same way that one relies on deductive 
reasoning since one of the primary functions of reason—as Burge [1993] 
states—is to present truth). Then, a basic inference will be a n o r m  o f  r a -
t i o n a l  a c t i o n , in such a way that only by the activity and in accordance with 
it, does a subject achieve intentionality. Furthermore, all action has a d i r e c t i v -
 
8 “(T)he most that can be said is that we construct ideal languages. But here the word 
“ideal” is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages were better, more perfect, 
than our everyday language: and as if it took the logician to shew people at last what a 
proper sentence looked like” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §38). 
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i t y , in that it is directed to something beyond the action itself. If one does not 
want to fall back into the regression to infinity produced by the recourse to inten-
tionality, this can be understood as a g u i d i n g  d i s p o s i t i o n . 
For Broome (2014a), the mental action in which inference consists is a guid-
ing disposition. Broome proposes that when one reasons or infers, one is guided 
by the rule. The guidance given in the rule is i n t e n t i o n a l  g u i d a n c e .9 This 
intention or habit is a disposition that guides the reason: “An intention is a sort of 
disposition to behave in a particular way.” (Broome, 2014b, p. 629). So, when 
one intends to comply with the rule, it is most likely that this intention is a habit. 
These intentions or habits are dispositions to the mental action that constitutes 
the rule. 
On the other hand, one can make mistakes in inferring. That is, one makes an 
inference because it seems correct, but it might not be. Broome has maintained 
that, even without defining what that correction consists of, what is important is 
the difference itself, the fact that one can distinguish between s e e m i n g  r i g h t  
and b e i n g  r i g h t . One makes an inference because it seems correct, but it does 
not mean that one is not going to make a mistake. According to Broome, infer-
ring wrongly is inferring anyway. Making an inference could be a problem if one 
wants to maintain certain logical normativity. 
To solve the mistake problem, Broome presents two senses of n o r m a t i v e . 
One can think of normativity as belonging to a correction standard (Broome, 
2014a, pp. 24–25). If one conceives normativity in that way, a rule would be 
automatically normative, (“right” as a synonym of “correct”), but then, when one 
utilized correct rules, there would be no error, no mistakes. Hence, Broome holds 
another sense of “weaker” normativity: there are rules that do not entail that one 
has reasons to follow these rules; and also, that a rule can be followed without 
apparent reason. This other sense of normative would involve a reason or an 
ought (Broome, 2013; 2014b). To make it clear, Broome distinguishes between 
normative guidance and intentional guidance: when one thinks one should do 
something, one is guided in some way to act, it is a normative guide. In this case,  
a belief-reason is insufficient, a belief-ought is needed. Applied to the rules of 
reasoning, one of the problems of normative guidance, according to Broome, is 
the acquisition of beliefs that a reasoning rule must be followed. If one has rea-
sons to follow the MPP (for example), the reasons must be rational. But rationali-
ty does not require following the MPP. MPP is a correct rule of reasoning, ac-
cording to Broome, because rationality allows it, not because rationality requires 
it. That is to say, although a rule is normative in a “weak” sense, it is not neces-
sary that it be so in a “strong” sense; one does not need normative thinking, nor  
a reason to believe the conclusion when one arrives at it following a rule. But, 
 
9 “Intentional guidance cannot be reduced to normative guidance, then. It does not 
need to be, because intentions provide perfectly good guidance by themselves; they re-
quire no help from normativity. On the other hand, normative guidance does need help 
from intentional guidance. A normative belief does not guide you directly” (Broome, 
2014b, p. 630). 
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from Boghossian’s view, one has yet to solve this question: “In general, nothing 
normative follows from the mere fact that one is following a rule. It all depends 
on the content of the rule. So, where does the normativity of obeying the law 
come from?” (Boghossian, 2015, p. 10). 
To answer, I would say there is a kind of “normative freedom”, as Railton 
(2000b) states; but these may not necessarily be two opposite perspectives. It 
could be said that the normative combines these two elements: force and free-
dom. To illustrate this point by which, in a broad sense one makes inferences on  
a daily basis (that is, without involving a specific rule): if one tells someone that 
one spent the afternoon reading and did so productively; would one take the 
calculator and do an operation to calculate exactly how many pages one read, or 
would one simply say one had read about x pages? The “mental calculations” 
and the more or less simple reasonings that one usually applies in one’s daily life 
do not always follow precise rules. And, on the other hand, there are rules, like 
the basic logical rules that are correct and objective, but it does not mean that one 
always has reasons to follow them. The objectivity of logic is not affected, since 
one has started from the distinction between seeming right and right. The basic 
logical rules do not cease being objective and correct just because a rule does not 
seem good to someone. The meaning I hold of “normative freedom” has to do 
with the potential capacity to give reasons to the supposed norms of reason. I put 
forth that, similarly, Boghossian argues that “rules and rule following facts are 
not normative in themselves”: 
Rules are themselves abstract objects: either normative propositions or instruc-
tions. Their status as norms on behavior can be explained in some cases without 
anything—as in the case of true moral propositions—or, in other cases, via their 
acceptance, either directly or indirectly. Following a rule is not in general a prob-
lem. What is a problem is explaining rule-following in cases where there is no ex-
plicit intention to conform one’s behavior to a rule. Finally, rules and rule follow-
ing facts are not normative in themselves. They derive what normativity they may 
on occasion have from the holding of some underlying moral truth. (Boghossian, 
2015, p. 11) 
To complete the picture of the relations between content and normativity,  
I would refer to the idea of a second nature. The role of mental actions is, rough-
ly speaking, to function as constitutive norms, as has been discussed. In this 
sense, we can maintain that logic is constitutive of thinking, and thinking, lan-
guage, culture, as a second nature (McDowell, 1994) takes place as part of hu-
man development. One of the central issues of Mind and World (McDowell, 
1994) is how it is possible to insert freedom and normativity into the scientific 
image of the world. McDowell solves this issue by overthrowing the dichotomy 
between the l o g i c a l  s p a c e  o f  r e a s o n s  and the r e a l m  o f  l a w s  and 
introducing the notion of second nature. The need for this concept is debatable, 
as I argue elsewhere (Garcia-Arnaldos, 2018), but McDowell points out this 
important aspect: it is not our mental states that determine the meaning of our 
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words, but it is the relationship with the world and with other subjects that does 
so. We understand because we have the ability to relate to one another. I perceive 
the rational connections, and, in this way, these links become rational to me. But 
reason alone cannot be understood without the ability to go beyond itself. The 
starting point is knowing, but our knowledge has limits. The limits of the thinka-
ble are determined by the characteristics of our faculty of understanding. One 
learns to make inferences only when one has a language and the language is 
always shared. Even if one invented a new language or expressions, one could 
not conceive them except with the elements, the linguistic “rules of the game” 
learned socially. To learn something new, a good inference must use a process 
that preserves truth; but, how does one learn to infer properly and use a process 
that preserves the truth? Surely, one cannot always avoid error, but as one studies 
ideal objects within the framework of a publicly controlled dialogic practice, one 
must be willing to rethink the legitimacy of the allegedly rational connections 
that constitute the space of reasons. Culture and science are collective activities 
and, as our second nature (McDowell, 1994), are part of human enrichment.  
4. CONCLUSION 
Upon analysing if inferential articulation is sufficient to account for concep-
tual content and in which sense concepts are norms determining the correctness 
in reasoning, inferentialists place judging over other kinds of mental acts. The 
question is whether the conceptual priority is in the judgment or the object and 
what theory of content is pursued. Grasping content as a matter of knowing how 
a word or concept behaves in inferences is not completely explicative. The main 
conclusions from the above investigations are as follows: 
I. Conceptual Role Semantic is not destined to play the principal role in  
a justification of logic or rule-circular justification. I believe that such posi-
tions are problematic. On the one hand, Boghossian’s answer to how to con-
nect the justification of deductive practice with the inferentialist conception 
of the meaning of logical constants based on the notion of blind reasoning— 
a capability to use rules without knowing those rules—is not a definitive so-
lution.  
II. I consider with Wright (2004a; 2014) that justification does not derive from 
conceptual understanding, but rather that the rules should be assumed as  
a starting point. On the other hand, Williamson (2011, p. 504) rejects the in-
ferentialist explanation and offers, instead, an approach based on the causal 
interrelations between speakers; it is these relationships that constitute the 
competence.  
III. Boghossian (2015) also faces the problem of what is a rule. Contrary to 
common opinion, he sustains that rules themselves can be thought of as con-
tents and contents are abstract objects (2015, p. 4). I discuss how abstract ob-
jects—like, for example, rules—would be constitutive of meaning. Basic in-
ferences are basic mental actions that function as constitutive norms, but log-
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ical rules are neither prescriptions of thinking nor psychological laws. I con-
tend that the conceptual priority is in both in the judgment and the object (the 
logical rules) and the requirements are logico‐metaphysical ones. In this 
sense, one can maintain that logic is constitutive of thinking. But reason 
alone cannot be understood without the ability to go beyond itself. One learns 
to make inferences only when one has a language and the language is always 
shared. Even if one invented a new language or expressions, I cannot con-
ceive them except with the elements, the linguistic “rules of the game” 
learned socially. In this sense, competence regarding language depends on 
participation in linguistic practice. 
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